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Since 1981, important changes in the federal tax provisions affecting
investment in business plant and equipment have occurred in every
year except 1983. There is no reason to believe that 1986 will be another
exception. Yet the methods economists commonly use to measure the
impacts of tax law changes not only generally assume that such changes
will be permanent but also ignore problems of transition. Such analysis
can be valuable for understanding the underlying differences among
alternative tax systems, but may be unhelpful, even misleading, if one
is attempting to understand the short-run impact on investment of a
tax change that may have been anticipated and may be foreseen as
temporary.
The purpose of this chapter is to present and use a framework for
tax analysis that is closely related to previous approaches but capable
of assessing the short-run impact on investment of very complicated
combinations of tax policies undertaken at specified dates with different
degrees of anticipation on the part of investors. At the same time, the
model generates predictions about the impact of these changes on the
market value of corporate securities that are consistent with the pre-
dicted path of investment.
Because the model's parameters are based on empirical evidence for
the United States, its predictions are not simply illustrative, but should
convey an impression of the actual quantitative effects of tax policy
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changes. Because it is a historical model, based on data beginning in
1953, it also allows us to perform counterfactual experiments to esti-
mate the effects of historical policies. Thus, we can (and do) evaluate
the performance of the activist tax policy of the last three decades in
altering the level and stability of investment over that period.
Another primary objective, however, concerns the future. In the past
couple of years, numerous tax reform plans have surfaced that would
make important changes in the incentives for business fixed investment.
Most would rationalize the treatment of depreciation for different types
of assets, remove the investment tax credit, and compensate, at least
in part, for the reduction in these investment incentives through re-
ductions in the statuary corporate tax rate. Among the most influential
such plans have been the Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax" (originally for-
mulated in 1983), the first and second Treasury plans (introduced in
November 1984 and May 1985), and the Rostenkowski plan formulated
by the House Ways and Means Committee and passed by the full House
in January 1986.
Each of these plans has been greeted with mixed but predominantly
negative responses from the business community, the primary criticism
being that they would reduce investment. The analysis below evaluates
these criticisms by estimating the marginal effects of several of the
proposals on the level and distribution of investment and on the value
of the stock market. An interesting point that surfaces in this analysis
is that, even to the extent that such plans may harm investment, they
should be very beneficial for the value of corporate equity. It is thus
somewhat ironic that they should be so vehemently opposed by many
of those who would appear to benefit.
Before turning to these results we describe the model used in this
paper, based on that developed in Auerbach and Hines (1986), and the
choice of parameter values used for the simulations.
5.1 Modeling Investment Behavior
The model of investment used in this chapter assumes that there are
two types of fixed investment (structures and equipment) and costs to
adjusting the capital stock. These costs may be separate or mutual and
may differ between structures and equipment. It is, in other words, a
q investment model with two types of capital. We choose this level of
aggregation to allow comparability with previous work, and because
the greatest variation in tax treatment has historically been between
these two broad classes of assets.
Consistent with the data, ours is a discrete time model with one-year
intervals. Each capital good is assumed to decay exponentially, and165 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
the representative competitive firm produces its output using labor and
the two types of capital subject to a constant returns to scale, Cobb-
Douglas production function, with at and a2 representing the gross
shares (including depreciation) of the equipment and structures, re-
spectively, in production. The adjustment cost function is assumed to
have the following form:
1
(1)
where Iit and Kit are net investment and capital of type / in year t, I,
and Kt are sums over both types of investment and capital, and p0, Pi,
and (32 are adjustment cost terms reflecting joint costs and costs specific
to the two types of capital, respectively.
Given the homogeneity of the production function and adjustment
cost function with respect to the scale of the firm, the value of the firm
will be proportional to the size of its capital stock and the behavior of
all firms can be represented by a single, aggregate representative firm.
The quadratic adjustment cost function in (1) is a two-capital-good
version of the one used by Summers (1981) in his empirical analysis.
It also differs in two other respects. First, it is based on net rather than
gross investment. Second, there is no constant subtracted from the
ratio UK in each quadratic term. However, one may equivalently view
the current model as being based on gross investment, with a constant
equal to the rate, 8, of economic depreciation being subtracted. Either
way, the notion is that minimum average adjustment costs (in this case,
zero) occur when net investment is zero. This makes sense if one views
the costs as general ones involving changing the scale of operations
rather than bolting down the new machines. Summers's preferred es-
timate of the constant term (.088) is quite consistent with this
interpretation.
We ignore changes in relative prices between capital goods and output
and between different types of capital, and assume that all new in-
vestment goods have a real price of unity in every year. The adjustment
costs are assumed to be "internal," in that they relate not to an upward
sloping supply schedule for capital goods but to the costs of absorption
at the firm level. This is consistent with the observation that historical
fluctuations in capital goods prices are relatively minor compared to
estimated costs of adjustment.
The firm's optimization problem consists of choosing equipment,
structures, and labor at each time t, taking account of current and (to
the extent of the assumed planning horizon) future economic condi-
tions. There is no risk from the firm's point of view; whatever it expects
about the future (right or wrong) is expected with certainty. If we let
the production function in the three factor inputs be F(-), then the firm166 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
seeks to maximize its value at time /, equal to the discounted value of
its real, after-tax cash flows:
(2) V, = 2 d + r)-^*-» {(1 - TS+1)(F(KU, K2s, Ns) - wsNs)
- (1 + r)(l - TJA(/J + (1 + r) 2 [-(1 - kis) Gis
i=\
where Ns is the labor input in period s; r is the real, after-tax required
return; ws is the real wage rate paid at the end of year s; Dfa, x) is the
depreciation allowance at the beginning of year s for assets of type /
purchased at the beginning of year x; kit is the investment tax credit
received on investment of type / at the beginning of year t; IT is the
rate of inflation; 8, is the rate at which capital of type i depreciates; Git
is gross investment of type i at the beginning of year t; and T, is the
tax rate at the beginning of year t
2 Depreciation allowances decay at
the inflation rate because they are not indexed.
We use the convention that year t investment occurs at the beginning
of the period, while quasirents occur at the end, with period t invest-
ment yielding its first return at the end of the same period. We also
assume that adjustment costs are immediately expensed, as would be
the case for internal adjustment costs that require extra factors or
reduce productivity. Gross and net investment of type / are related by
the identity:
For labor, the optimal condition derived by differentiating (2) with
respect to N calls for the firm to set the marginal product of labor equal
to the real wage. As usual in models of this sort with constant returns
to scale, the labor demand equation is omitted from explicit analysis.
For each type of capital good /, it is most convenient to derive the first-
order condition with respect to gross investment at each date t, G,,.
Assuming, for the moment, an infinite horizon and perfect foresight,
this yields:
(4) 9u = [(1 + r)/(l - T,+ 1)] [qit - kit
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where (using (1) and (3))
(5) p,, = dFJdKit - dAtJdKit
= dFJdKu + %WLVt+ilKy + 2b,{It+1/Kit)]
K^ + 28,(4 +./*,,
is the "total" marginal product of capital at the end of period t, taking
account of reduced concurrent costs of adjustment, and qit is the mar-
ginal cost of a unit of capital, less tax savings associated with costs of
adjustment:
(6) qit = 1 + (1 - T,)[(W,/*,-I) + MiJKit-i)]
Equation (5) reminds the reader that there are two components to
the firm's marginal value of an additional piece of capital this year: the
marginal product of capital (dFJdKit) and the reduction in next year's
adjustment costs (dAt+l/dKit). Expression (4) says that firms should
invest in capital of type / at date t until its marginal product, after tax,
equals its after-tax cost (multiplied by (1 + r) because costs are borne
at the beginning of the period) less the present value of investment
credits, depreciation allowances, and future quasirents. Thus, the
expression is the result of the optimal backward solution for firm be-
havior. When expectations are static, as is commonly assumed, (4)
reduces to the standard user cost of capital formula:
(7) Pa = q'itir + 5,)(1 - kit - T,ZJ-,)/(1 - T,)
where zit equals the present value of depreciation allowances D£s, t)
and
(8) q'u = (<lit ~ kit - Ttzit)/(l - kit - Ttzit)
is a tax-adjusted price of new capital goods that we will interpret below.
Because of the assumption that production is governed by a Cobb-
Douglas production function, the direct marginal product of capital of
type i in period t is:
(9) Fit = fl,N,«-i-2> o^r
(1-
ai
) K% .7 = 3-1
where a, is the production function constant. Thus, given the optimal
choice of labor input, expressions (4) and (5) for / and j give us two
equations in the capital stocks Ku and K2t. Without adjustment costs,
this would permit a closed-form, backward solution for these capital
stocks in each period.
3 However, since qt depends on lagged capital
stocks, this solution method is no longer possible, and we must resort
to simulation analysis.168 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
5.1.1 Parameterization
Three types of parameters appear in the model just described, relating
to production ( a, al5 a2, 81, 82, p0, Pi,
 and 32) taxation (T, kx, k2, Di(-) and D2(-)) and financial markets ( r and IT). For TT, we use the realized
values of the GNP deflator (year on year), while T is set equal to the
statutory corporate tax rate that prevailed for the majority of the year.
4
Firms' required rate of return, r, is set equal to after-tax real rate on
4- to 6-month commercial paper which prevailed in the year of in-
vestment, plus a risk premium that is taken to be constant. This series
on adjusted interest rates was calculated by (10):
(10) ra = 0.06 + (1 - T)PR - INFL
where ra is the adjusted rate, PR is the nominal (annualized) return on
4- to 6-month paper, and INFL is the contemporaneous inflation rate.
The after-tax risk premium in (10) is 6%, which roughly corresponds
to the historical difference between after-tax risk-free interest rates and
after-tax profit rates.
In order to calculate the production parameters a and 8 and the tax
terms k and /)(•), it is necessary to aggregate data on 34 classes of
assets for which we have data (20 equipment and 14 structures) into
corresponding values for aggregate equipment and structures. This turns
out to be a very complex problem. The method used is described in
the appendix.
Once values of 8t and 82 are known, it is possible to estimate the
capital share parameters a! and a2 from production and capital stock
data. We begin by calculating the net-of-depreciation, before-tax return
to capital in the corporate sector in 1977 by dividing the difference
between value added and labor compensation in the corporate sector,
taken from the 1977 Census of Manufactures, by the total corporate
capital stock, equal to equipment and structures plus inventories and
land. We then assume that all forms of capital earned this before-tax
rate of return, Rg.
5 Next, we assume that the Cobb-Douglas production
function specified above refers to gross output net of returns to inven-
tories and land,
6 calculated as follows:
(11) G = Y + 8^, + 82ii:2 - Rg(K3 + K4)
where Y is value added and K3 and K4 are stocks of inventories and
land.
Once we have obtained this value of G, we note that, since output
is observed net of adjustment costs, the production function F() must
satisfy:
(12) F{KU K2,N) = G169 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
Finally, we define the net return to capital of type i (i = 1, 2) in the
current period as being the derivative of G with respect to Kh holding
constant the capital stock growth rates (JXIKX), (I2/K2) and {UK), less depreciation 8,-.
7 This yields (using (1) and (9)):
(13) Rg = txflKi - V2p0(//^)
2 " ViMJKP -»/ i = 1, 2
which can immediately be solved for a,.
8





with the estimated value of Rg equal to 10.4%. This estimate of the
marginal product of capital (which is used only in the calculation of a!
and a2) is consistent with previous findings. In interpreting the sizes
of the two share coefficients, it should be remembered that these are
shares in gross output, less estimated returns to land and inventories.
Relative to usual calculations of the capital share of net output, the
first of these factors (the use of gross output) would lead to a larger
total share (since depreciation is included in both numerator and de-
nominator) while the second (excluding part of the capital stock) would
lead to a smaller total share (since returns to excluded capital are
subtracted from both numerator and denominator.)
The production function constant a is obtained for 1977 by dividing
F(') by the product of its component factors raised to the power of
their respective factor shares. We then assume that the labor input, in
efficiency units, grows at a constant rate of 3% over the entire sample
period.
9 This imparts a trend rate of growth to the steady state of the
model. That it is slightly below the historical capital stock growth rate
of about 4% may be because part of that growth is attributable to the
historical decline in effective tax rates on investment.
In order to obtain a historical series for a that would be consistent
with observed fluctuations in the profitability of capital, we use data
on after-tax corporate rates of return from Feldstein, Poterba, and
Dicks-Mireaux (1983), updated to include 1984. We took the 1984 value
to prevail for all subsequent years. Assuming capital market equilibrium
and constant returns technology, this rate of return will be equal to the
marginal gross return to capital, Rg in (13). Note that this methodology
implicitly assumes that yearly variation in the return to capital is at-
tributable to shocks to the production function and not to changes in170 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
the capital/labor ratio. Then, using (9) and (13), the technical and labor-
related component of the production function can be computed:
(l-«l-«2)
If. -I- K' 1 /A.I
(14) a, =
D \Nt
where the left side of (14) is the value to be calculated, and C and D
are constants, with C equal to:
(15) C = V2(0.03)
2(3o + Pi*i + M2) + Mi + 82*2
where s, is the share of capital of type 1 in the capital stock ($, + s2 = 1).
Since (14) is a relationship which holds for all years, it must hold for
1977, the year from which values are calibrated. Marginal products of
capital for all other years were calculated using 0^ and a2 and the
assumption that KJNt is constant: to solve for a, relative to its value
in 1977,
The only parameters that remain to be chosen are the adjustment
costs terms p0, Pi, and p2, which are quite crucial to our analysis.
Previous studies have inferred these parameters from regressions of
investment on "tax-adjusted q." The authors of these studies have
derived "tax-adjusted q" by correcting the ratio of the market value
of the firm to its capital stock (presumed to be average q) for tax factors
such as the investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation, and the
deductibility of adjustment costs that would cause marginal and average
q to differ. In one case (Abel and Blanchard 1986), average q is explicitly
estimated from projected future profits and interest rates. A regression
of / on adjusted q can then be interpreted as estimating the inverted
marginal cost function.
In a model with one capital stock, the coefficient on adjusted q would
be an estimate of 1/p, the inverted marginal adjustment cost. Although
such regressions cannot be done if there is more than one capital stock,
one can still interpret the coefficient as the inverse of the sum of mar-
ginal adjustment costs associated with investment of type /, or
[p0 + p/]-
1 in the current model.
Empirical investigations have found this coefficient to be quite small.
However, for many reasons usually pointed out by authors of the pre-
vious studies, these coefficients (which are not always even statistically
significant) may be prone to serious downward bias because of an
inexact measure of q being used.
1
0
Given the uncertainty of what the "true" values of p0, Pi, and p2
should be, we choose values that, given the other parameters of the171 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
model, make the variances of the growth rates of investment in equip-
ment, structures, and the two categories together that are generated
by a historical simulation with perfect foresight roughly equal to their
historical values for the period 1954-84. While this methodology is
somewhat arbitrary, it derives from the observation that, in the sim-
ulations, fluctuations in investment are particularly sensitive to the
configuration of adjustment costs.
Postwar investment history suggests that adjustment costs are sub-
stantial and not symmetric between equipment and structures. The net
stock of equipment grew at a mean annual rate of 5.0% between 1954
and 1984, while structures grew 3.1% annually and total capital grew
at a 3.9% rate. The historical variances of equipment, structures, and
total net investment rates were .041%, .0070%, and .012% respectively.
Adjustment cost parameters for the simulations were chosen to ap-
proximate as closely as possible these variances with those generated
by the perfect foresight simulation when investors expect the 1985 tax
law to stay unchanged forever. Choosing p0, Pi>
 and 02 to equal the
common value of 6, as in Auerbach and Hines (1986), produces in-
vestment variability that does not conform well with the historical
evidence: structures investment is too variable in these runs and equip-
ment investment not variable enough. On the basis of experiments with
several parameterizations, we found that the values p0 = 15, Pi = 0,
p2 = 20 produced results which most closely mirrored actual invest-
ment. This specification of adjustment costs yields equipment, struc-




To compare these chosen values of p0, Pi> and p2 to those found in
the previous literature on aggregate investment, note that the value of
P corresponding to a dollar increase in net investment proportional to
the weights of equipment and structures in the capital stock is
P = Po + &iPi + &2P2> where kt is the fraction of the capital stock rep-
resented by capital of type /. Given typical values of kx and k2, this




5.1.2 Solution of the Model
In the presence of adjustment costs, the model as specified can only
be solved numerically. There exist different techniques to obtain such
solutions. The one used here is described in great detail in Auerbach
and Hines (1986).
All simulations begin with the assumption that, prior to 1954, the
economy was in a steady state: that economic conditions had been
stable for sufficiently long that the stocks of both kinds of capital had172 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
completely adjusted, and no change in these conditions was anticipated.
Though this is undoubtedly inaccurate, some such assumption is re-
quired to fix the initial values of capital stocks in a way that is consistent
with the assumed production technology.
This solution for the steady state in 1953 does not depend on any
future variables. Indeed, when expectations are assumed to be com-
pletely myopic throughout, the model can then be solved forward with-
out iteration, with each year's solution beginning with Kt_t and solving
for Kt. At the other extreme is the assumption of perfect foresight. By
this we mean that all tax and inflation rates are correctly anticipated
until the present. It is hard to implement this assumption for future
dates, so we make assumptions about the values of these variables and
suppose that firms' expectations match them. We then solve the model
into the twenty-first century to guarantee convergence to a new steady
state.
5.1.3 Measuring the Effects of Policies
In addition to the two capital stocks, we calculate three variables of
interest. One is the average q of the representative firm, its value
relative to the replacement cost of its capital stock. This starts with
the marginal q obtained directly from the adjustment cost function, and
then takes account of the variety of tax provisions that make old and
new capital differ in value. The second is the effective tax rate, which
summarizes the incentive to invest in a particular asset in a given year.
The third is the net investment flows of equipment and structures which
the simulation generates.
5.1.4 Estimating Average q
It is this variable that tells us what the overall impact of a tax change
will be on market value. Generally, there will be two effects. To the
extent that the incentive to invest increases,marginal q, defined to be
the basic price of a unit of capital capital plus the derivative of the
adjustment cost function with respect to investment, will rise. In the
absence of taxes, the homogeneity of production and adjustment cost
functions would imply that this would also be the firm's value per unit
of capital.
But to the extent that the new incentive magnifies the distinction
between new and old capital, the difference between marginal q and
average q will also rise. The net effect on average q can be either
positive or negative for expansionary or contractionary policies. Hold-
ing marginal q constant, an increase in average q may be viewed as a
lump sum transfer to the owners of corporate capital.
The formula for average q is based on an arbitrage condition between
old and new capital. Since new capital goods must generate after-tax173 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
cash flows equal to marginal q, it follows that
(17) qit = T,[po(//K,-i) + frdJKu-i)] + PVit + kit
+ 2 T,((1 + r)/(l + r + T
where qit is marginal q and PV[t is the present value of the after-tax
quasirents accruing to an new asset purchased for one dollar at date
t. Since capital purchased at t' < t has a present value of quasirents
of (1 - hy-
f'PVit, it follows that its value at date t, per efficiency unit
of capital, is
(18) qiu r = PVit + £ T,((1
- 8,)'
Solution of (17) for PVit and substitution of this expression into (18)
gives a solution for the value of capital of type i and cohort t' at time
t, in terms of qit. From (1) and the definition of marginal q, we also
have:
(19) qit = 1 + UUKt) + WJKU)
Combining (18) and (19) to get each cohort's value, we then aggregate
these values of average q over all vintages and both types of capital to
obtain an overall value for the firm at date t.
Note that this expression for average q is consistent with the as-
sumption of perfect foresight. When myopic expectations are assumed,
we change (17) and (18) correspondingly.
5.1.5 Calculating Effective Tax Rates
In models based on myopic expectations, it is common to define the
effective tax rate to be the percentage difference between the net (of
depreciation) marginal products of capital before and after taxes. Given
a fixed after-tax return, this calculation also tells us what the before-
tax, or social return to capital must be for the firm to earn zero profits.
Unless the economy actually is in a steady state, however, this will be
correct only in the year the calculation is made. Hence, the effective
tax rate as commonly used measures the required before-tax return to
capital in the same year, assuming myopia.
When firms are not myopic, the formula for the user cost of capital
is different, but we can still answer the same question, namely, What
rate of return on capital must the firm earn in the current year, taking
account of future changes in taxes, inflation, and the firm's marginal
product of capital? As before, this will tell us what the firm's rate of174 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
return on investment must be, before taxes, in the current year. Drop-
ping subscripts, the effective tax rate is defined to be:
(20) 6 = [(p/q - 8) - rVip/q - 8)
where p is the marginal product of capital defined in (5).
It is not clear which value of q should be used in (20). The most
obvious candidate is marginal q, as defined in expression (19). How-
ever, use of this value has the effect of incorporating the tax deduction
for adjustment costs in the effective tax rate. This is perfectly accept-
able; it reflects the fact that part of the cost of investment is expensed.
However, it makes more difficult a comparison with previous results,
since even when there is economic depreciation of direct capital costs,
the effective tax rate will be less than T. By using the tax adjusted
value, q', defined in (8),
1
3 one "undoes" the differential tax treatment
of adjustment costs, and obtains the usual results for expensing, eco-
nomic depreciation, and other special cases. Hence, for the sake of
comparability with other studies in which adjustment costs were ig-
nored, we take this latter approach.
5.2 Simulation Results
This section presents the results of simulations, chosen to provide
answers to some of the questions raised above. We begin by contrasting
the historical patterns of net investment in equipment and structures
with net investment series produced by simulation runs using myopic
and perfect foresight assumptions about investor expectations of future
tax laws and macroeconomic conditions.
Table 5.1 presents net corporate investment, expressed as a fraction
of the capital stock, in equipment and structures for the period 1953-
84. These investment rates are not derived from the published BE A
net investment series; they are calculated by applying the BEA gross
investment data and Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates to form a per-
petual inventory of corporate capital assuming the published 1925 net
capital stock to be accurate. The investment series produced by this
method are then measured consistently with net investment calcula-
tions from the simulation runs.
Table 5.1 illustrates several sharp features of the postwar investment
experience. Equipment investment strongly accelerates in the mid-
1960s, possibly in part in response to the introduction of the investment
tax credit and repeal of the Long amendment. Both equipment and
structures appear to be affected by business cycle downturns in 1970-
71 and 1975-76. Structures never recover from the latter shock. In-
vestment in every year of the post-1975 period fails to equal any of its

















































































































































Tables 5.2a-c and 5.3a-c present results from simulations in which
investors have myopic expectations and perfect expectations respec-
tively. The main point is to illustrate the effects of expectations on the
smoothing of investment and the impact that movements in marginal
q have on average q when adjustment costs are present. Both simu-
lations are performed for the period 1953-90, under the assumption
that Congress passes no post-1985 tax reform proposals and investors
(in the perfect foresight simulation) correctly anticipate that there will
be no changes.176 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.



































Table 5.2a and 5.3a present effective tax rates for these two simu-
lations. For each year there are two numbers: the effective tax rates
for equipment and structures, respectively. These results are quite con-
sistent with those of the previous literature. Since effective tax rates
depend not only on the tax treatment of new investment but also on
macroeconomic conditions and investment adjustment costs, a casual
examination of effective tax rates does not reveal all the incentives
built into the tax code. Effective tax rates may be useful for purposes



















































































































































Beginning from effective tax rates in 1953 well above the statutory
rate of 52% for equipment, and somewhat lower for structures, effective
tax rates for the myopic simulation in table 5.2a move lower with the
tax changes introduced in 1954, and again in 1962 with the introduction
of the investment tax credit. Tax rates on equipment go down again in
1972 with the reintroduction of the investment tax credit and the in-
troduction of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System. Effective







































































































































to be discussed shortly. By 1980, higher rates of inflation have pushed
effective tax rates back up to earlier levels, particularly on equipment.
The introduction of ACRS in 1981 brought effective tax rates on equip-
ment essentially to zero, also lowering tax rates on structures to a
postwar low. Reduced inflation in 1982 brought tax rates down still
further. Rates went up in 1983 on equipment and 1984 on structures
because of the 1982 and 1984 tax acts, which introduced a 50% basis
adjustment for the investment tax credit and an 18-year (instead of 15-
year) tax life for structures, respectively.
The net investment rates for equipment, structures, and aggregate
capital are displayed in table 5.2b, expressed as a percentage of the
respective capital stocks. The substantial adjustment costs built into179 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment





































































































the model have the effect of raising marginal q when investment tax
incentives are strong, thereby encouraging firms to smooth their in-
vestment. Despite this effect, the investment series in table 5.2b is
highly erratic. The variance of structures investment is almost ten times
its historical value, and episodes such as the introduction of the in-
vestment tax credit in 1962 and its removal at the end of the 1960s
produce unrealistically sharp investment changes.
Years such as 1975 illustrate some of the hazards of modeling in-
vestment behavior under myopic expectations. Net structures invest-
ment in the model is 15% that year, and equipment investment is - 3%.
These incongruous results are produced by the economy's deep reces-180 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
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sion that year and the accompanying low real interest rates and marginal
products of capital. The enormous decline in real interest rates leads
to a desired shift to longer-lived investment. Since myopic investors
expect the cost of capital never to change in the future, they find
themselves desperately short of structures when costs fall in 1975. Their
one-period time horizon prevents them from delaying enough of their
investment to minimize adjustment costs efficiently, and leads to un-
realistically sensitive investment demands. That is, they are assumed
not to anticipate a decline in marginal q from its current high level.181 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
Values of average q, as reported in table 5.2c, reflect the pattern of
investment as well as tax law changes. Average q has generally declined
over the years as the distinction made by the tax system between old
and new capital has widened. Under a system of economic deprecia-
tion, average q would equal marginal q net of the tax deduction of
adjustment costs, as defined in (6) (averaged over the two types of
capital). At a steady state growth rate of 3%, a corporate tax rate
of about 50%, and with structures comprising about 60% of total capital,
the steady state value of average q would be 1.14. In the short run,
average q is determined both by the distinction between new and old
capital (the difference between average q and marginal q) and by the
value of marginal q itself. A change in the incentive to invest will
typically affect both of these terms, sometimes in different directions.
Though the estimated time series given in table 5.2c suggest that
average q for total capital was above one throughout the postwar pe-
riod, it exceeded 1.14 only for the period before 1982. After the ac-
celeration of depreciation allowances in 1954, and throughout the 1950s
and until 1981, average q remained quite high. The mid-1960s invest-
ment boom in particular contributed to marginal q and therefore average
q. Adverse macroeconomic conditions discourage investment in the
1980s, thereby lowering marginal q. Combined with the increased gap
between new and old capital brought about by ERTA, this moves av-
erage q closer to one.
Table 5.3a presents effective tax rates for the perfect foresight sim-
ulation. The results are qualitatively similar to those in table 5.2a, with
the exception that investment is steadier and so effective tax rates are
jostled less by movements in marginal q.
Table 5.3b contains the perfect foresight investment series. Struc-
tures investment is very smooth over the whole time period, generally
declining from 1954 until the late 1960s, rising then and declining there-
after. The presence of substantial joint adjustment costs raises the cost
of structures investment when firms are investing heavily in equipment,
and this effect is reflected in downward movements in structures in-
vestment rates for 1962 and 1972, years in which the investment tax
credit was introduced. Similarly, structures investment recovers in 1967,
when the investment tax credit was removed. Equipment investment
follows the opposite pattern over these years, and is subject to much
wider investment swings generally. The persistence of very high his-
torical equipment investment over the period 1965-69 as reported in
table 5.1 is not reproduced in the equipment investment series in table
5.3b; simulated investment responds quickly to incentives in 1962 and
1964, but dies out much more quickly in subsequent years.
Table 5.3c reports average g's for this perfect foresight simulation.






































































































































strong secular drift downward over the whole time period. Other than
for the effects of strong investment and consequent high marginal <?'s
in the mid-1960s, changes in the tax system have over time progres-
sively increased the distinction between old and new capital in these
runs.
The salient features of the historical investment pattern seem to be
best captured by the perfect foresight simulation. Besides the generally
less variable investment behavior it produces, its results for equipment
in the mid-1970s and structures at the end of the 1970s are much closer
to the actual investment pattern than is the case for the myopic sim-
ulation. Historical equipment and structures investment remained strong183 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
through 1974 and then declined in response to the recession. Investment
in the myopic simulation responds too quickly to the macroeconomic
and tax law changes, while the perfect foresight investors can see ahead
to the next tax reform or phase in the business cycle and so their
investments show the same kind of smooth transitions one finds in the
historical series. Of course, the perfect foresight investment series do
not always match historical investment: at the end of the 1970s, for
example, perfect foresight investors would have known that ACRS was
coming and would have reduced equipment investment much more than
was the case in reality. And neither simulation run can explain the
recent boom in equipment investment.
1
4
5.3 Effects of Historical Investment Policies
One of the most important investment incentives of the period under
consideration is the investment tax credit. While the investment tax
credit reduces the partial-equilibrium user cost of equipment, some
authors have suggested that the destabilizing effects of the credit over
the business cycle mitigated its investment incentive for equipment and
reduced incentives for structures investment.
1
5
Table 5.4 presents investment series from a simulation in which it is
assumed that the government never instituted an investment tax credit.
The tax law is otherwise unchanged, and this run assumes that investors
have perfect foresight. Some of the results are predictable: equipment
investment rises much less quickly in 1962 and 1972 than it does in
table 5.3b. In addition, equipment investment dies at the end of the
1970s when the investment tax credit is not present to mitigate the
effects of adverse macroeconomic conditions.
The variance of equipment investment in this simulation is 0.024%,
which is less than the 0.035% variance of investment reported in the
perfect foresight run (table 5.3b) when the investment tax credit is
present. While one might be tempted to conclude that the investment
tax credit was destabilizing, such an interpretation depends on the sense
in which stability is understood. Mean equipment growth for the sim-
ulation reported in table 5.4 is 2.86%, which is substantially less than
the 3.4% growth rate reported in table 5.3b. The coefficient of variation
for investment in the simulation with the tax credit removed is 0.54,
which is very close to the 0.55 coefficient of variation for investment
in the historical law perfect foresight (table 5.3b) simulation. It appears,
then, that in raising both the mean and variance of investment the
investment tax credit has not substantially changed its relative stability.
Of course, it is hard to know in a model like this one whether absolute


















































































































































Table 5.5 presents investment series from simulations in which the
investment tax credit was never introduced and firms have myopic
expectations about future conditions. The mean growth rate of equip-
ment is 3.54%, which is higher than in the perfect foresight simulation
but still smaller than the 4.0% growth rate when investors receive the
investment tax credit. The variance of equipment investment is 0.047%,
and the coefficient of variation is 0.61. Thus the relative stability of
equipment investment in the absence of an investment tax credit seems



















































































































































The introduction of ACRS in 1981 made new investment significantly
more attractive than it would have been under the prevailing ADR
system. Table 5.6 presents simulation results which illustrate the effects
of this legislative change while holding the rest of the economic en-
vironment constant. In this simulation investors have perfect foresight
and ACRS is never introduced.
Equipment investment in table 5.6 is significantly lower than cor-
responding perfect-foresight equipment investment in table 5.3b for the













































































































































investors correctly anticipate and wish to smooth future adjustment
costs, equipment investment in this run falls off slightly from invest-
ment in table 5.3b as early as 1966. In the absence of ACRS, average
annual equipment investment is somewhat lower and its variance mar-
ginally higher (since ACRS was introduced at a time when macroeco-
nomic conditions were unfavorable to investment). The coefficient of
variation for equipment investment in this run is 0.59. Structures in-
vestment is less sharply affected by the absence of ACRS. Structures
investment in table 5.6 is slightly lower than that in table 5.3b starting
in 1959, and experiences a small drop in 1981.187 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
High rates of inflation may discourage investment by lowering the
present value of nominal depreciation allowances.
1
6 Table 5.7 illustrates
the effects of rising inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s, by presenting
results from a perfect-foresight simulation in which depreciation allow-
ances are indexed to inflation starting in 1954. Equipment investment
in table 5.7 is substantially higher over the period 1965-74 than it is
in the perfect-foresight simulation without indexing (table 5.3b). De-
spite more generous depreciation allowances under indexing, equip-
ment investment in table 5.7 is lower in the 1980s than is the investment
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adjustment from a higher capital stock, and is a further reminder of
how misleading static cost-of-capital calculations can be in explaining
investment. Equipment investment and its variance in table 5.7 are
somewhat higher than those in table 5.3b, and have a coefficient of
variation of 0.58. Structures investment in table 5.7 is slightly higher
than investment in table 5.3b, but does not diverge from the other
series very much over any ranges.
5.4 The Economic Effects of Tax Reform
In this section, we consider the impact on investment and firm value
of three tax reform proposals that have been seriously considered by
the Congress during the past year. The proposals share certain attri-
butes but also have their differences.
All three plans would repeal the investment tax credit. The first plan,
the Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax," would reduce the corporate tax rate
to 30% and provide assets with 250% declining balance depreciation
over lifetimes similar to those of the asset depreciation range of the
1970s. The second plan, proposed by President Reagan in May 1985
and generally referred to as Treasury II, would provide specified write-
off patterns with comparable lifetimes, fully indexed for inflation, and
reduce the corporate tax rate to 33%.
n The third plan, passed by the
House of Representatives and often called the Rostenkowski plan after
the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, would reduce
the corporate tax rate to 36% and provide 200% declining balance
depreciation with a switchover to straight-line, indexed for half of all
price level changes in excess of 5% per year.
Because all plans would remove the investment tax credit, one would
expect a shift in the mix of investment toward structures. The statutory
rate reductions should contribute to increases in the value of corporate
equity, though the total impact on value of these plans will also depend
on the as yet undetermined effects on the overall incentive to invest.
In order to compare the effects of the plans, we simulate each starting
from the same initial conditions, and assuming that 1985 economic
conditions (e.g., profitability and inflation) will prevail in each subse-
quent year. The particular assumptions made about previous behavior
affect only the equipment and structures capital stocks with which we
begin. We assume that investors behaved from 1954 through 1985 with
perfect foresight, but expected the tax law and economic conditions of
1985 to last forever.
In considering the effects of the plans, we must also make an as-
sumption about the behavior of interest rates. Since both corporate
and personal tax rates would fall under each plan, it is reasonable to189 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
expect that some decline in before-tax interest rates would occur; how
much is difficult to know without a more complete model of interest
rate determination. Thus we consider two polar assumptions: that the
real interest rate after-tax remains constant, and that the real interest
rate before-tax remains constant.
Tables 5.8a and 5.8b show the effects on investment of the plans.
For comparison, we present in the first column the investment figures
predicted for the case in which no change in policy occurs. Tables 5.9a
and 5.9b present the corresponding values for average q.
Table 5.8a, which presents results for the constant after-tax real
interest rate assumption, shows that, without any change in the tax
law, investment would be predicted to grow slowly over the next five
years as a fraction of the capital stock but remain low. This is a con-
tinuation of the investment pattern that should have occurred in recent
years in response to the very high prevailing real interest rates and low
returns to capital. The growth simply reflects the gradual approach
back to the steady state investment level of 3%.
A switch to Bradley-Gephardt would increase the tax burden on
equipment and decrease that on structures. In the long run, the effective
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Table 5.9a Tax Reform and Market Replacement Cost (Constant After-Tax
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to 4% and 31%, respectively, under present law. This results in a pre-
dicted drop in equipment investment of 1.6% of the equipment capital
stock, and an increase of .5% in structures investment. By 1990, the
aggregate capital stock is predicted to be about 1.5% lower because of
the change. At the same time, the proposal is predicted to cause a jump
in the stock market. The average q for both equipment and structures
rises substantially, with an aggregate increase in market value of 26%!
Over time, it continues to increase as the level of aggregate investment
recovers.
Under Treasury II, investment in both equipment and structures
would fare better than under the Bradley-Gephardt plan. Overall, in-
vestment would fall very little, with long-run effective tax rates of 18%
on equipment and 23% on structures. Because of the higher corporate
tax rate imposed, Treasury II would also result in lower windfalls than
under Bradley-Gephardt, despite its more favorable impact on invest-
ment and marginal q.
The Rostenkowski plan would be less favorable for investment than
either of the other two proposals, imposing, in the long run, an effective
tax rate of 31% on both equipment and structures. The larger rise in
the equipment tax burden, combined with the much lower adjustment192 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
costs associated with equipment, leads to a sharp decline in equipment
investment in 1986, with structures investment behaving much as it did
in the previous two simulations. Aggregate fixed investment is pre-
dicted to drop by .9 percentage points in 1986 because of adoption of
the plan. Given the size of the fixed corporate capital stock relative to
GNP, this translates into a drop in investment of just under six-tenths
of a percent of GNP and about 5% of gross nonresidential fixed in-
vestment. By 1990, the capital stock would be about 3.3% lower than
under current law.
Because it would lower the statutory tax rate the least, to 36%, and
because it decreases marginal q the most through reduced investment,
this plan would provide the smallest windfall to existing capital of the
three plans. The aggregate value of average q would rise by 16%,
compared to 26% under Bradley-Gephardt and 23% under Treasury II.
Thus the Rostenkowski plan would raise more revenue from both new
and old assets than would either of the other plans.
The simulations presented in tables 5.8b and 5.9b correspond to the
assumption of a fixed before-tax interest rate. The associated increase
in after-tax interest rates under the reform plans leads to further re-
ductions in investment and windfalls to old capital. Nevertheless, in
no simulation does the windfall fall below 7% of the market value of
the capital stock, despite the quite large declines in investment and
marginal q that are predicted.
5.5 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter illustrates the importance of anticipated
changes in taxes and other economic variables on investment behavior
and firm valuation. Simulation results suggest that postwar U.S. cor-
porate investment behavior can be understood as the outcome of a
process in which investors anticipate the general direction of future
tax changes. To be sure, our simple model of perfect foresight corporate
investment does not explain all the major movements in investment
over this period. Yet the simulation runs which explore the conse-
quences of myopic investor expectations reveal how poorly this mod-
eling approach, which is standard in static models, performs in a dynamic
context.
The simulation experiments presented in this chapter describe the
likely consequences of several alternatives to the historical pattern of
corporate taxation. We examine the effects of the investment tax credit
by simulating the last 25 years of firm behavior in its absence, and find
that although the tax credit increased the variance of equipment in-
vestment, it increased mean equipment investment by even more. Of
more pertinence to current policy discussions, we also simulate the193 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
effects of three of the proposed tax reform proposals. We find that the
Treasury II, Bradley-Gephardt and Rostenkowski corporate tax plans
all would discourage investment and reduce the size of the corporate
capital stock relative to the effects of the current law. One of the
advantages of the model described in this chapter is that we can use
it to measure the extent of the windfall gains enjoyed by old capital
upon introduction of these plans.
Several important aspects of the determinants of corporate invest-
ment and firm valuation remain poorly understood. The results in this
chapter make us suspect that more attention needs to be devoted to
the process by which investors form expectations about future tax
policy and macroeconomic conditions.
Appendix
Aggregation of Depreciation Rates and
Tax Parameters
What we seek are parameters for aggregate capital goods that, by some
measure, accurately reflect those of their components. One criterion
that seems reasonable is to require that, for a particular tax system,
both net and gross rates of return to capital before tax be the same for
the aggregate assets as for the sums of their components. A particular
motivation for using this approach is that it results in the effective tax
rate, as usually measured, being invariant to the aggregation procedure.
To see what weights this criterion dictates, consider first the special
case in which adjustment costs are zero and expectations are myopic.
Let ft,-, be the fraction of capital stock j of the total in its class i
(equipment or structures) at a particular date. (We suppress the time
subscript but emphasize that these capital stock weights are not time
invariant.) The gross before tax return to capital of type i is then
(Al) p,- = 2 nijPj = 2 atj(r + 8,) (1 - kj - TZ,)/(1 - T)
j j
where 8,-, kj and Zj correspond to asset j. The net return is:
(A2) rf = p, - 2 tofij
j
Thus, the criterion would be satisfied by weighting the individual values
of 8 by capital stock weights H and the tax parameters k and z by
fl(r + 8); the tax parameters of short-lived assets should be more heav-
ily weighted. This is an important choice, since the values of k + iz
generally increase monotonically with 8.
1
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Since capital stock weights change over time, this formula would
require recomputation every year. However, this presents an index
number problem, and it is unclear that we should prefer a measure
with varying weights. Even after this issue is resolved, one must deal
with the problem of adjustment costs and varying values of asset-
specific g's, about which there is little information. Finally, there is the
problem of expectations. When the marginal product of capital is dic-
tated by expression (4), there are no simple weights (that we can think
of!) that satisfy the criterion. One would generally have to determine
the weights simultaneously with the solution for the marginal product
itself, which would make the problem intractable.
In light of the situation, we choose to weight 8 by ft and tax param-
eters by ft(r + 8), using fixed values for r and the capital stock weights
ft over time. The capital stock weights used are for the year 1977, as
described in Auerbach (1983). The rates of economic depreciation come
from calculations by Hulten and Wykoff (1981). The fixed value used
for r is .04.
Notes
1. For ease of notation, we write A(-) as a function of /, alone rather than
all its arguments.
2. The constancy of IT is not assumed in our analysis, and is used here only
for the sake of simplicity. Some of the later simulations examine the effect of
allowing r to vary.
3. Note that net investment is simply the first difference of the capital stock.
4. This and other tax data used are described in appendix A of Auerbach
(1983).
5. This would be true only if, among other things, the effective tax rates on
all forms of capital were equal, which they were not.
6. This assumption is required if we are to consider the investment decisions
separately for structures and equipment.
7. This marginal product definition is required for G to be homogeneous of
degree one with respect to its inputs.
8. The internal consistency of this procedure can be verified by noting that,
given this solution for a! and a2, Rg{Kx + K2) equals [(ai + a2)F - A(f) - hxKx - b2K2] which, by (11) and (12), equals [Y - Rg(K3 + K4) - (1 - a, - a2)F]. Thus the net returns to capital equal value added less the competitive
return to labor.
9. Denison (1979, 92) finds all factors and productivity changes other than
capital growth to contribute exactly 3.00% annually to the growth of U.S.
nonresidential business output over the period 1948-73. While this figure in-
cludes noncorporate businesses and would presumably be lower over the period
of the 1970s, it suggests that 3% is the most reasonable choice for the exogenous
growth rate of noncapital inputs.195 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
10. These include the presence of returns to other factors in the firm's market
value, heterogeneity of the capital stock, and the standard use of a tax ad-
justments based on myopia of expectations about future changes in the tax
law. Some evidence in support of this comes from the finding by Abel and
Blanchard (1986) that the coefficient of investment on adjusted q rises sub-
stantially when the variable is purged of that part of its variation estimated to
have come from fluctuations in the cost of capital (as opposed to profitability).
In addition, there has been very little work done which estimates separate
adjustment cost parameters for different types of capital; for an exploratory
effort, see Chirinko (1984).
11. As Andrew Abel has pointed out, if actual investment series are measured
with noise then our calibration method will in general lead to adjustment cost
parameters which are smaller than the true parameters. However, our resulting
estimates are similar to those obtained from q investment equations, which we
believe to yield estimates that are biased upward.
12. See the discussion in Auerbach and Hines (1986).
13. When expectations are nonmyopic, q' is defined consistently, with future
changes in ir taken into account.
14. Nor is it easily explained by the assumption that investors know that
one of the favorable tax reform proposals is imminent. In a perfect foresight
run (not reported here) in which it was known all along that the House Ways
and Means Committee proposal was to be adopted in 1986, equipment in-
vestment in 1985 would be only 1.3%. This conclusion could be reversed,
however, if investors only recently learned of a forthcoming tax law change.
15. See, for example, Auerbach and Summers (1979).
16. Of course, inflation affects the incentive to invest through other channels
as well. See, for example, the discussions in Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981),
and Hall (1981).
17. Also proposed as part of Treasury II was a recapture of "excess depre-
ciation" attributable to investors being able to take into the tax base at a 33%
rate income deferred through accelerated depreciation under the current 46%
tax rate. The provision would have raised an estimated $56.1 billion between
fiscal years 1986 and 1989, equal to about 2% of the value of the fixed corporate
capital stock in present value. This provision is not included in our calculations.
If truly unanticipated, however, its inclusion in our model would simply lead
to a reduction in the 1986 value of average q under Treasury II of about 2%,
with no other impact. As the results below suggest, this lump sum tax is quite
small compared to the windfall gains that Treasury II would produce overall
for owners of existing assets.
18. We note in passing that if the rate of growth of the capital stock, say g,
equals the interest rate, then this latter set of weights corresponds to using
investment flow weights rather than capital stock weights.
References
Abel, A., and O. Blanchard. 1986. The present value of profits and cyclical
movements in investment. Econometrica 54, no. 2:249-73.
Auerbach, A. 1979. Inflation and the choice of asset life. Journal of Political
Economy 87, no. 3:621-38.196 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
. 1983. Corporate taxation in the United States. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 14, no. 2:451-505.
Auerbach, A., and J. Hines. 1986. Tax reform, investment, and the value of
the firm. NBER Working Paper no. 1803 (January).
Auerbach, A., and L. Summers. 1979. The investment tax credit: An evalu-
ation. NBER Working Paper no. 404 (November).
Bradford, D. 1981. Issues in the design of savings and investment incentives.
In Depreciation, inflation, and the taxation of income from capital, ed.
C. Hulten, 13-47. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Chirinko, R. 1984. Investment, Tobin's Q, and multiple capital inputs. Cornell
University, mimeograph.
Denison, E. 1979. Accounting for slower economic growth: The United States
in the 1970s. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.
Feldstein, M., J. Poterba, and L. Dicks-Mireaux. 1983. The effective tax rate
and the pretax rate of return. Journal of Public Economics 21:129-58.
Hall, R. 1981. Tax treatment of depreciation, capital gains, and interest in an
inflationary economy. In Depreciation, inflation, and the taxation of income
from capital, ed. C. Hulten, 149-66. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute
Press.
Hulten, C, and F. Wykoff. 1981. The measurement of economic depreciation.
In Depreciation, inflation, and the taxation of income from capital, ed.
C. Hulten, 81-125. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Summers, L. 1981. Taxation and corporate investment: A q theory approach.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 12, no. 1:67-127.
Comment Andrew B. Abel
Alan Auerbach and James Hines have skillfully built, calibrated, and
simulated a model to analyze the effects of tax policy on U.S. capital
investment. Their simulation model produces time series for investment
in equipment and structures, effective tax rates, and market valuations
of firms. I will address three major issues in my comments: (1) the
usefulness of a ^-theoretic simulation model to examine the dynamic
response of investment to tax policy changes; (2) calibration versus
estimation as a method for choosing parameter values; and (3) the
stabilizing or destabilizing effects of the investment tax credit.
1. The q theory of investment provides a simple and logically co-
herent framework for analyzing the dynamic response of investment
to changes in tax policy. The theory depends quite heavily on the
existence of convex adjustment costs—the notion that the marginal
cost of investment is an increasing function of the rate of investment.
Andrew B. Abel is Amoco Foundation Term Professor of Finance at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania and a research associate of the National Bureau
of Economic Research. This comment was prepared while he was John L. Loeb As-
sociate Professor of the Social Sciences at Harvard University.197 Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
Increasing marginal adjustment costs imply that investment will re-
spond smoothly to changes in tax policies, and the q theory has proved
to be extremely useful in analyzing the responses to temporary as well
as permanent tax changes and the responses to anticipated as well as
unanticipated tax changes. The phase diagrams used in the q model
are simple and powerful tools which probably lead some of us to put
more faith in the ability of q models to predict the short-run dynamic
behavior of investment than is warranted.
Although there is some empirical support for the q model of invest-
ment, there are three major problems when the q theory is confronted
with actual data. The theory predicts that investment will be a function
only of the contemporaneous value of marginal q. In particular, neither
contemporaneous output or profits nor lagged q should affect invest-
ment. However, empirical investment equations typically find that, on
quarterly data, both lagged q and some measure of output or profits
have significant effects on investment. Furthermore, these equations
usually leave unexplained a large serially correlated portion of the
variation in investment. Of these three departures from the simple
theory, the most crucial for the issue of the timing of investment is the
finding that lagged q and twice lagged q have significant effects on
investment. If lagged q as well as contemporaneous q is a determinant
of investment, then the dynamic structure of investment and, in par-
ticular, the short-run response of investment to tax policy is dramati-
cally altered. Although the econometric evidence to date cannot defin-
itively conclude that the significance of lagged q is due to delivery lags,
it does at least remind us of the fact that it often takes several months
for new equipment to be ordered, acquired, and installed. The delivery
lag for structures is more appropriately measured in quarters or even
in years.
The Auerbach-Hines model is based on annual data and one may
argue that for equipment, at least, delivery lags are not important.
However, the lags for new structures probably are quite substantial
and, to the extent that the time paths of equipment and structures are
linked (both through each component's effects on the marginal product
of the other component and through interrelated adjustment costs), the
lags in structures investment will spill over into equipment investment.
2. After specifying the structure of their simulation model, Auerbach
and Hines had to choose values for the parameters of the model. I will
focus on their method for choosing the parameters of the adjustment
cost function (30, pl9 and @2- Previous authors have estimated these cost parameters from regressions of investment on q. In a model with
only one type of capital good, the adjustment cost parameter (3 is equal
to the inverse of the coefficient of investment on q. Auerbach and
Hines decided against using available econometric estimates for the198 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
adjustment cost parameters because, in their judgment as well as the
judgment of some the people who produced these estimates, the esti-
mated adjustment costs are too large; equivalently, the coefficient on
q is considered to be too small. The reason for the alleged downward
bias in the coefficient on q is that q is measured with error.
In order to avoid the downward bias in the response of investment
to changes in q, Auerbach and Hines chose values of the adjustment
cost parameters fJ0, $u and p2 which produced simulations in which
the variance of investment is equal to the historical variance of in-
vestment. A complete analysis of the properties of the Auerbach-Hines
procedure for choosing values for fi is quite complex and certainly
beyond the scope of this comment. To examine their procedure in a
simple special case, suppose that y, is investment and that we want to
estimate 0 in the regression
(1) y, = toft + *t
where q*t is the true value of marginal q at time /. However, the true
value of marginal q is unobservable but we can observe qt which is a
noisy measure of marginal q
(2) qt = q*t + T),
For simplicity, we assume that e, and i\, are each serially uncorrelated
and are uncorrelated with each other. Substituting (2) into (1) yields a
relation between investment y, and the observable variable qt
(3) y, = Qqt + c, - 6-n,
The Auerbach-Hines procedure chooses an estimate QAH to equate the
variance of the predicted series O^var^,) with the variance of yt.
Letting QOLS be the ordinary least-squares estimate of 8, we have
(4) plim QOLS =: cov(y, q)/var(q) =
(5) plim QAH = [var(y)/var(tf)]
1/
2 = vyhq
where vx denotes the standard deviation of x and p is the contempor*
anoeus correlation between qt and yt. It is clear from (4) and (5) that QAH
is greater than QOLS which is biased downward because of measurement







As a measure of how well the simulated investment series tracks the
expected value of the investment series over the historical sample, we
can calculate the correlation of the predicted series, tiAHqt, and the
expected value of yt, Qq\. It can be shown that asymptotically
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Observe from (7) that the correlation of the simulated series and the
expected value of yt approaches one as a^
2 approaches zero. However,
as or^
2 approaches zero, the estimate QAH becomes increasingly biased
upward. The implication of this upward bias is that if the measurement
error is unaffected by the simulated changes in policy, then the simu-
lated effects of tax policy on investment will be overstated.
3. In order to address the question of whether the investment tax
credit (ITC) is stabilizing or destabilizing, Auerbach and Hines present
simulation results both with and without the ITC. They find that the
presence of the ITC leads to a higher mean rate of investment and a
higher variance of the rate of investment; the coefficient of variation
of the rate of investment is hardly affected by the presence or absence
of the ITC. In addressing the question of whether or not the ITC is
stabilizing, Auerbach and Hines come to different conclusions de-
pending on whether they measure stability by the variance or by the
coefficient of variation of investment. The authors do not take a stand
on which measure is more appropriate. It is worth noting that in the
absence of population growth, the stochastic steady state of the econ-
omy would have an average growth rate near zero (the average value
of UK may not be literally zero), and in this case the coefficient of
variation would be undefined.
If one is ultimately interested in social welfare, then the focus on
the stability of investment is, of course, misplaced. Ideally, the model
could be closed by including consumers who save and consume in order
to maximize an intertemporal utility function. Specifying individual
utility functions would then allow for a direct comparison of utility in
the cases with and without the ITC.
In the absence of a general equilibrium model, it would appear that
focusing on the stability of GNP would be more appropriate than fo-
cusing on the stability of the rate of investment. To get a handle on
the question of the stability of GNP, note that under myopic expec-
tations q = FKI[{\ - k - 7z)r] where FK is the marginal product of
capital, r is the real rate of interest, k is the rate of the ITC, T is the
corporate tax rate, and z is the present value of depreciation deductions.
Now consider a simple IS/LM model in which Y = c(Y) + I(q) + G
where Fis national income, c(Y) is a Keynesian consumption function,
I(q) is the investment equation, and G is government purchases of goods
and services. In comparing the cases with and without the ITC, note
that the interest sensitivity of q is greater in the presence of the ITC.
Therefore, the presence of the ITC causes the IS curve to be flatter
than in the absence of the ITC. Finally we assume that the rate of
inflation IT is fixed and that there is a standard upward-sloping LM
schedule m = L(Y, r+ir) where m is real money balances and L(,) is
the real demand for money.200 Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr.
Now consider the case in which the IS curve is fixed but the LM
schedule is subject to random shocks. In this case, an outward shift
of the LM schedule reduces the interest rate and increases both in-
vestment and output. In the presence of the ITC, the increases in both
output and investment are greater than in the absence of ITC (see fig.
5.1). A symmetric argument for leftward shifts of the LM schedule
suggests that the ITC destabilizes both output and investment.
Alternatively, suppose that the LM schedule is fixed but that G is
stochastic. An increase in G shifts the IS curve to the right, leading to
higher output, higher interest rate, and lower investment. In the pres-
ence of the ITC, the drop in investment is larger and increase in output
is smaller than in the absence of the ITC (see fig. 5.2). A symmetric
argument for a decrease in G suggests that under this stochastic spec-
ification the ITC again destabilizes investment. However, contrary to
the case with a stochastic LM schedule, the ITC stabilizes output.
IS (with ITC)
IS (no ITC)




Fig. 5.2 Stochastic government spending